Research on neighborhood structural conditions like concentrated disadvantage and crime largely focuses on between-neighborhood differences; for example, places with more disadvantage are expected to experience higher homicide rates. However, empirical research often does not consider within-neighborhood dynamics of structural stability and change. Furthermore, several recent studies have found cross-sectional associations between structural variables and crime outcomes can vary significantly across units, violating a key assumption of global modeling strategies. The current work explores if and how historical changes in disadvantage influence neighborhood collective efficacy and homicide rates, net of the level of disadvantage at a given time point. Collective efficacy theoretically mediates the relationship between conditions and crime, and is hypothesized to be the mechanism through which structural change influences homicide rates. It is also hypothesized that spatial variation in cross-sectional associations between disadvantage and social outcomes can be explained by accounting for within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage. Using a sample of Chicago neighborhoods and ordinary least squares and geographically weighted regression models, I find that within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage significantly predict neighborhood collective efficacy, though the effects of this change on homicide rates are not completely mediated by collective efficacy. Within-neighborhood change completely accounts for spatial variation in cross-sectional associations, offering one explanation of prior research findings. Within-neighborhood structural changes appear to disrupt collective efficacy and contribute to higher homicide rates than predicted by the level of disadvantage alone. A key insight of the earliest social ecologists of the Chicago School-Robert E. Park, Ernest W. Burgess, Roderick D. McKenzie, Louis Wirth, and W.I. Thomas, among others-was to view the growth of the city not simply as an aggregation of the population into urban areas, but the outcome of multiple forces, institutions, and social processes like immigration and the building of social bonds. While these scholars largely focused on the then-current growth of the modern American city and
the spread of urbanism, they laid the foundation for an enormous body of work on macro-level relationships between structural conditions, social mechanisms, and a host of outcomes including crime and juvenile delinquency (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Cohen 1955; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Sampson 2012; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Shaw and McKay 1969; Veysey and Messner 1999) . In contemporary criminological research, collective efficacy-an intellectual heir to the social disorganization theories of Clifford R. Shaw and Henry McKay (1969) -has become a dominant perspective of neighborhood structural conditions and crime, spurred by the work of Robert J. Sampson and others (Browning 2002; Bruinsma et al. 2013; Graif and Sampson 2009; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson 2002 Sampson , 2012 Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson et al. 1997; Sutherland, Brunton-Smith, and Jackson 2013) . Advances during this wave of research have gone far in addressing critiques of earlier works' "black box" problem, where the process(es) linking structural conditions to crime at the neighborhood level were largely inferred.
One neglected area in contemporary criminological research, however, is the intrinsically dynamic nature of neighborhoods. Early Chicago School scholars were clearly aware of the importance of structural stability and change: Roderick McKenzie tentatively defined the emerging field of human ecology as the "study of the spatial and temporal relations of human beings as affected by the selective, distributive, and accommodative forces of the environment" (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1967:63-64 ; emphasis added), and the terms "process" and "change" occur often in Ernest Burgess's discussion of the growth of the city, where he suggested social organization and disorganization were macro-sociological processes paralleling biological "processes of metabolism" in the human body (Park et al. 1967:53) . Social consequences like crime do not emerge in neighborhoods out of whole cloth, but are the result of ongoing processes linking structural conditions to the outcome. These processes are inherently temporal; neighborhoods are embedded in complex systems of economic and social forces, which both produce and are the product of neighborhood structural conditions.
Modern ecological theories of neighborhood crime continue to emphasize the importance of structural conditions for predicting crime rates. However, recent empirical work often fails to address the theoretically important role of within-neighborhood structural change-and its inverse, stability-over time, and its implications for relationships hypothesized to link conditions and crime rates. This is a substantial gap in the criminological literature. The theoretical influence of neighborhood conditions emerges over time as a function of dynamic processes, and research that focuses on between-neighborhood differences in the level of a particular condition-like economic disadvantage-overlooks the possibility that neighborhoods that appear similar in cross-section (e.g., have comparable levels of disadvantage) may have substantially different structural histories. The current research builds on prior work that found both the cross-sectional level of disadvantage and historical changes in disadvantage were significant predictors of neighborhood homicide rates (Becker 2016) by incorporating a measure of one mechanism theorized to mediate the disadvantage-crime relationship: collective efficacy. Structural changes are not expected to directly impact homicide rates. Instead, I hypothesize they influence the growth and operation of collective efficacy, or lack thereof, which in turn impacts homicide rates. My goal is to suggest future neighborhoods and crime research would profit from addressing the understudied role of within-neighborhood structural change, and encourage exploration of the inherent dynamism of neighborhood conditions, social processes, and crime.
L I T E R A T U R E R E V I E W
Theorizing Within-Neighborhood Dynamics By assuming aggregate units like cities-and neighborhoods-are embedded in "metabolic" processes of stability, growth, and change, it is possible to view them from a developmental or life course perspective. Like individuals, cities are "born," grow or decline, and in general change (or not) over time, and the dynamics of cities and neighborhoods are comparable to those of an individual's life course (see Sampson 2012) . Borrowing the vocabulary of the age-graded theory of informal social control (Laub and Sampson 2003; Sampson and Laub 1993) , aggregate units like neighborhoods follow trajectories of development over time, face transitions embedded in these trajectories that mark changes in structural or social conditions, and some transitions may act as turning points that redirect the developmental trajectory of the city or neighborhood. The theory speaks to the importance of "continuity and change over the life course" for individual-level criminal propensity (Sampson and Laub 1993:9 ; emphasis in original), by and large determined by informal social control stemming from social ties. If the life course of the individual plays a role in explaining individual offending and desistance, it seems likely the "life course" of the neighborhood would play a similar role. Several of the general principles of neighborhood criminology laid out by Robert Sampson (2013) speak to this point. He stresses the importance of both continuity (stability) and change (instability) in neighborhoods and argues that criminology must cultivate a "life course of place" (p. 12) aimed at answering the basic but difficult question of how a neighborhood's past impacts its present (also see Kirk and Laub 2010; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002) . In this sense, neighborhood history is the macro-level analogue to individual biography.
It is possible within-neighborhood dynamics are, at least in part, responsible for findings of spatially variant cross-sectional relationships between structural conditions and crime outcomes. An important assumption of nonspatial cross-sectional models is spatial invariance-that the relationship between a given predictor and outcome is the same across geographic units, or "stationary" (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002) . Work that directly tests this assumption generally finds it does not hold; associations between independent and dependent variables have been significantly different across counties (Light and Harris 2012) , census tracts (Graif and Sampson 2009 ), block groups (Cahill and Mulligan 2007) , and neighborhood clusters (Becker 2016) . If the mechanisms linking structural conditions to neighborhood crime are embedded in the neighborhood's developmental trajectory, it is possible that within-neighborhood historical dynamics explain these results. Spatially variant relationships found in models that do not account for within-neighborhood change may result from differences between neighborhoods that have similar levels of a given condition in cross-section but have substantially different histories of that condition.
The Dynamics of Disadvantage, Collective Efficacy, and Homicide
The question of how structural stability and change matter is particularly salient for concentrated disadvantage. This conceptualization of deprivation differs in important ways from univariate measures of poverty. Not only is the measure itself based on multiple dimensions of deprivation (for both theoretical and statistical reasons), but how it affects the neighborhood also diverges from prior eras. Shaw and McKay (1969) described an ecological process where poverty drove neighborhood instability. During the time period they studied, social and residential mobility allowed individuals to move away from impoverished areas, creating neighborhoods with stable, high levels of social disorganization and thus crime and delinquency. Though the poverty level was stable, the internal composition of the neighborhood was not, and the process of disorganization rarely reached its ultimate stage of reorganization (though see Whyte 1943) .
In the modern era, however, this relationship appears to have been reversed to some extent. William Julius Wilson (1997 Wilson ( , 2012 describes the emergence of concentrated disadvantage as a confluence of larger social and economic processes at work in the United States in the later decades of the twentieth century. Unlike Shaw and McKay's era, the mobility available to individuals and groups in such deprived neighborhoods was absent. High levels of concentrated disadvantage not only promoted higher levels of crime and related social ills, but were commonly conceptualized as inhibiting neighborhood change. This is the critical point explored here: while the level of disadvantage continues to predict between-neighborhood differences in homicide rates, the stability of conditions would also predict differences in the strength of the disadvantage-homicide relationship among neighborhoods with similar levels of disadvantage. This is because neighborhoods suffering from high levels of disadvantage are likely to remain that way, isolating and trapping residents in structural conditions that represent a "tangle of pathologies" that are durable over time (Sampson 2009 (Sampson , 2012 . This type of disadvantage does not lead to a lack of within-neighborhood equilibrium as in Shaw and McKay's time, but instead may actually promote the stability that fosters neighborhood reorganization and the growth of collective efficacy. A similar mechanism has been observed in rural areas, where poverty promotes rather than deters residential stability, with concurrent reductions in crime (Osgood and Chambers 2000) . In this case, social disorganization continued to have a positive association with area crime, but the distal relationship between poverty and disorganization was reversed.
1 Theoretically, structural stability should have a positive effect on neighborhood organization, net of its level of disadvantage (or some other condition), producing lower-than-expected crime rates. Prior work supports this argument; Jacob H. Becker (2016) found that within-neighborhood changes in concentrated disadvantage between 1970-2000 partly accounted for spatial variation in the crosssectional association between disadvantage in 2000 and homicide in [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] , and the results further suggested that changes in disadvantage were disruptive to the neighborhood and predictive of higher homicide rates. Within-neighborhood dynamics appeared to play an important role in the relationship between structural conditions and crime (at least homicide). Other research has shown that the ecological structure of neighborhoods is often in flux (Schuerman and Kobrin 1986) , and the disruptive effect of within-neighborhood change is consistent with previous work on neighborhood equilibrium (Bursik 1986; Bursik and Webb 1982) , gentrification (Covington and Taylor 1989; Kreager, Lyons, and Hays 2011; Taylor and Covington 1988; van Wilsem, Wittebrood, and de Graaf 2006) , rural poverty (Osgood and Chambers 2000) , and the concentration of disadvantage (Krivo and Peterson 1996; Morenoff et al. 2001; Wilson 2012) .
Like conditions at a given point in time, neighborhood structural (in)stability is not directly related to neighborhood crime rates. Instead, it is theoretically linked via some social mechanism that mediates the association. For Shaw and McKay and others, this process was social disorganization (Bursik 1986; Osgood and Chambers 2000; Sampson and Groves 1989; Shaw and McKay 1969; Veysey and Messner 1999) . From this perspective, within-neighborhood structural instability undermines the ability of the neighborhood to reorganize (though possibly along a qualitatively different standard of social norms and expectations; see Whyte 1943) , through building social ties and community attachment that depend on temporal stability in neighborhood conditions (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974) . The importance of this stability remains in recent evolutions of social disorganization theory. One of these-collective efficacy-has become a dominant perspective on neighborhood conditions and crime (and other outcomes) in the last several decades (Browning 2002; Bruinsma et al. 2013; Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999) . Conceptually, collective efficacy is a combination of two types of social capital in the neighborhood: social cohesion and mutual trust among residents, and a willingness and ability to exercise informal social control in the neighborhood. The more of each a neighborhood has, the higher its level of collective efficacy is expected to be, and the lower its level of crime. Tests of collective efficacy's role as a mediator between structural conditions and crime generally find support for this model (Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson 2012; Sampson et al. 1997) , though there is some evidence the benefits of collective efficacy can be diluted in neighborhoods with strong social networks, where criminals draw upon rules of "reciprocated exchange" with pro-social individuals to avoid sanctioning (Browning, Feinberg, and Dietz 2004) . It is also possible that collective efficacy does not operate in the same fashion in non-U.S. neighborhoods (Bruinsma et al. 2013 ).
While rarely made explicit, neighborhood stability is theoretically important to the creation and operation of collective efficacy, and is one probable mechanism through which structural (in)stability in the neighborhood exerts an influence on homicide rates. Some of the earliest work on collective efficacy discusses the "destabilizing potential" of neighborhood change (Sampson et al. 1997:919) and points out that structural stability contributes to the construction of social ties and efforts to maintain social control. However, the influence of within-neighborhood stability on collective efficacy-and thus crime-has largely been ignored in recent work, and while Becker's (2016) findings are suggestive, the analyses do not account for collective efficacy. The effect of structural (in)stability on mediating social processes like collective efficacy represents a critical and understudied dimension of neighborhood effects and crime research. The level of a particular condition remains important in explaining between-neighborhood differences in collective efficacy and crime. It is the stability of neighborhood disadvantage, however, that may explain cross-sectional differences in the outcome among neighborhoods that share a particular level of disadvantage. Reorganization or collective efficacy may exist in the face of disadvantage given neighborhood stability over time, resulting in lower crime rates than predicted by the level of disadvantage alone. Inversely, neighborhoods with relatively low disadvantage (or high affluence) but more structural instability may have lower collective efficacy than expected, leading to higher crime rates.
C U R R E N T S T U D Y
It is theoretically likely the stability of a neighborhood's structural conditions would play a role in predicting crime-related outcomes like homicide. Social mechanisms linking conditions to crime do not emerge fully formed, but would develop, wax, and wane as a function of neighborhood change. It is possible the effects of structural stability over time are separable from those of the level of a given condition at a particular point in time, with stability intensifying or weakening the cross-sectional relationship between the level of that condition and the outcome. Alternatively, it is possible the stability of a condition plays no role in predicting neighborhood crime rates, nor influences the crosssectional relationship between level and outcome; this is the "null" hypothesis against which the results of these analyses are compared. This study focuses on how structural change within Chicago neighborhoods may affect two social outcomes-collective efficacy and homicide rates-at a given time point. It should be noted that this question is conceptually distinct from one that asks how changes in neighborhood conditions may impact changes in the outcome (e.g., if decreases in disadvantage predict declines in homicide rates; see McCall, Parker, and MacDonald 2008) .
The current study extends prior work by examining if and how collective efficacy in 1995 mediates the association between changes in neighborhood disadvantage from 1970-1990 and homicide rates in 2001-2005 , net of the level of disadvantage in 1990. Having partially replicated previous work (Becker 2016 ) using a slightly different time frame, I construct models that treat collective efficacy in 1995 as the outcome. Within-neighborhood structural changes would not be directly related to homicide rates; instead, this association would be mediated by collective efficacy (or another mechanism). I am unaware of research that explores spatial variation in the cross-sectional association between concentrated disadvantage and collective efficacy, but previous work testing the spatial invariance assumption (Graif and Sampson 2009; Light and Harris 2012) suggests it will be significant. Adding a measure of within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage is expected to account for this variation, with change negatively related to neighborhood collective efficacy net of the level of concentrated disadvantage.
If both the disadvantage-homicide and disadvantage-collective efficacy cross-sectional associations are spatially variant, and if this variation can be accounted for by within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage, it is logical to hypothesize that within-neighborhood change will not have a significant direct relationship with homicide rates in a "full" model that includes collective efficacy as a mediator. It will be unnecessary to control for within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage, as collective efficacy will capture the influence of structural stability. Prior research has found collective efficacy mediates, at least in part, the effects of the level of disadvantage on neighborhood crime rates (Sampson et al. 1997) . I expect a similar theoretical mechanism will account for the influence of within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage on homicide rates. There will be no significant relationship between changes in disadvantage and homicide, and the association between the level of disadvantage in 1990 and homicide rates (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) will be spatially invariant, once collective efficacy is included in the model. The full theoretical model examined here is visualized in Figure 1 . Neighborhoods' levels of disadvantage in 1990 are expected to have a negative relationship with collective efficacy in 1995, as shown in earlier work. This study adds a new element to the model in the form of the relationship between neighborhood changes in disadvantage from 1970-1990 and collective efficacy in 1995. The model assumes that within-neighborhood histories of disadvantage have a direct negative effect on collective efficacy at a given time point, independent of the association between the neighborhood's level of disadvantage and collective efficacy. Net of neighborhood disadvantage in 1990, neighborhoods with more structural instability will have lower levels of collective efficacy in 1995, and thus higher homicide rates.
Chicago is an ideal subject for this study for several reasons. First, an extensive scholarly tradition uses the city as a social laboratory to explore sociological and criminological questions, and there is a wealth of readily available data to draw upon. The results and conclusions of the current study fit into and extend this tradition, and fill an important gap in the literature. Second, the city of Chicago experienced a great deal of structural change during the last third of the twentieth century, which continues today. Many of these changes express trends like the urbanization and concentration of poverty attributed to processes beyond Chicago itself, such as global forces reshaping the American economy (Wilson 2012 ) and racial segregation (Massey and Denton 1993) . Between-neighborhood differences in poverty and other measures of disadvantage appear durable over time, both from 1970-1990 and beyond, but the average level of disadvantage and other structural features such as racial composition within Chicago neighborhoods has varied a great deal over the decades. The current study is limited to an examination of structural conditions between 1970-1990, when within-neighborhood levels of disadvantage were stable or increased to some degree, but it appears that "(i)nequality is stubbornly persistent even though change is constantly taking place" (Sampson 2012:117) into the 1990s and 2000s, periods where both national economic trends (e.g., the Great Recession) and Chicago-specific changes (e.g., the removal of public housing) continue to resonate. Some neighborhoods experienced large unexpected changes in the level of poverty and disadvantage, even as the distribution across neighborhoods remained relatively unchanged. Socioeconomic and spatial mobility continues to be limited (or nonexistent) for some individuals and groups, and more difficult to attain in certain neighborhoods, well into the twentyfirst century (see Sampson 2012; Wilson 2012) . As mentioned later, the current study is somewhat limited by the realities of structural changes in Chicago during the 1970-1990 time frame, but can serve as a foundation for future work that considers other periods and places with different or more complex histories of structural change, or employs alternative measurement strategies to operationalize such change (see Delmelle 2016) . 
The role of within-neighborhood structural dynamics on the relationships between concentrated disadvantage, collective efficacy, and homicide rates in Chicago neighborhoods are examined using three data sources. Decennial census data from 1970, 1980, and 1990 are used to construct measures of structural conditions at the "neighborhood cluster" (NC) level. This unit of measurement was created as part of the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN) to represent ecologically meaningful units in studies of neighborhoods (Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson 2012) . Data were obtained at the tract level; to ensure identical geographical units were used over time (given potential boundary changes from one census to the next), boundaries were standardized using the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) (Geolytics 1970 (Geolytics -2000 . Tract-level data aggregated to the NC level resulted in a final sample of 342 NCs.
2 Homicide data from 2001-2005 were taken from the Chicago Police Department's online database (CLEAR 2012) . Finally, PHDCN Community Survey (PHDCN-CS) (Earls et al. 2007 ) data were used to create a measure of collective efficacy in 1995.
Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable of interest is a measure of collective efficacy, conceptualized as the intersection of social cohesion and mutual trust with the ability to exercise informal social control within a neighborhood. Measures of "informal social control" and "social cohesion and trust" were taken from the PHDCN-CS, and in keeping with past research (Sampson et al. 1997) appeared to be strongly related and tap into the same underlying latent variable (r ¼ .801, p < .001). These measures were combined using factor regression to produce a summary variable of each NC's level of collective efficacy in 1995. Collective efficacy is treated as an outcome in the first set of models and as a mediator in the second set.
The five-year average homicide rate per 10,000 residents for each NC is the outcome of interest in the final full model. The CLEAR database tracks crimes known to police by type and year; data include geographic information on where events occurred. All homicides from 2001-2005 were geocoded by tract then aggregated to the NC level. Using the average annual number of homicides over this time span, the homicide rate per 10,000 residents (based on the 2000 decennial census population) was then calculated. A multiyear average rate is commonly used to reduce potential bias introduced by year-to-year fluctuations in crime, particularly relatively rare types like homicide. The skewed distribution across NCs was transformed using a natural log function in keeping with prior work.
Independent Variables
Neighborhood effects research in criminology often focuses on three summary measures of structural conditions: concentrated disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and residential stability. A number of highly collinear univariate measures are combined into a single conceptually distinct variable via a factor regression procedure (see Sampson et al. 1997 ). This is a straightforward strategy when examining a single year of data but more complicated when examining conditions over time. Comparisons of factor loadings in the 1970, 1980, and 1990 data indicate the same univariate measures load in substantively similar fashion; however, the distribution of these measures changed considerably over time. Since the factor regression procedure normalizes the distribution of the final factor score measures, direct comparisons over time are affected by shifts in the intercept-the sample mean of a factor in a given year. Visualized in Figure 2 , each hypothetical curve represents the sample distribution of concentrated disadvantage factor scores in a given census year, and the order of NCs in the distribution is assumed to be identical year to year. The real level of disadvantage rises year to year-for example, due to increases in univariate components like the poverty rate-represented by the shift in the curves from left to right. An NC with a level of concentrated disadvantage in 1970 equal to the sample mean for all NCs would have a factor score of zero for 1970. The same NC could again have a level of disadvantage equal to the sample mean for 1990 and a factor score of zero, and calculating the difference would suggest concentrated disadvantage within this NC did not change over time. However, if the mean level of concentrated disadvantage across all NCs in Chicago actually rose or fell in real terms, a simple change score measure would be deceptive; in reality, it would only indicate if an NC's level of disadvantage, relative to all Chicago neighborhoods, changed (i.e., its "ranking" within the sample).
To avoid this obstacle, I based the current factor score measures on the distributions of the univariate components across the entire time period. This makes it possible to directly compare levels of a particular structural condition in an NC over time, because factor scores are standardized to the average factor loading and univariate distribution across all three time points. The only remaining source of variation in the factor scores is the level of the univariate components in a given census year. The rotated factor loadings of the component variables from 1970 through 1990 are shown in Table 1 and are consistent with earlier work (Sampson et al. 1997) .
The primary independent variable, concentrated disadvantage, is comprised of the proportion of NC residents who are black, the proportion unemployed, and the proportion of households that are female headed, below poverty, or on public assistance (a ¼ .98). The other two measures of structural conditions are treated as control variables: immigrant concentration is determined by the proportion of Hispanic and foreign-born residents in the NC (a ¼ .80), while residential stability consists of the proportion of residents living in the same location five years earlier and the proportion of housing units that are owner occupied (a ¼ .64). The level of each of these conditions is measured in 1990.
In addition to the measure of disadvantage in 1990, I explored several strategies to capture withinneighborhood changes in disadvantage from 1970 to 1990. Some prior work has employed groupbased trajectory models to describe historical change within neighborhoods or similar units (Groff, Weisburd, and Yang 2010; Stults 2010) . However, as Daniel S. Nagin (2005) points out, the search for distinctive patterns of change can be as much art as science and relies heavily on variation within the sample under investigation. Upon examination, actual patterns of change in concentrated disadvantage in Chicago between 1970-1990 did not lend well to this strategy. Several trajectories emerged in the data; however, further inspection suggested most differences between groups were due to the level of disadvantage over time, while the shape of the trajectories (capturing change) was relatively similar. Instead, a straightforward change score of concentrated disadvantage between 1970 and 1990 was calculated. Since the factor measure was standardized to allow comparisons over time, this change score represents real changes within neighborhoods (e.g., positive values indicate increases in disadvantage). After examining potential ways to specify "change" based on direction and degree, a Table 2 .
Analytic Strategy
Building on research that found spatial variation in the relationships between structural predictors and crime outcomes, and with the expectation that within-neighborhood dynamics can explain this variation, I tested the spatial invariance assumption in the cross-sectional relationship between neighborhoods' levels of concentrated disadvantage in 1990 and homicide rates in 2001-2005 using ordinary least squares (OLS) and geographically weighted regression (GWR). Cross-sectional models of neighborhood effects, like OLS, typically generate a single estimate of the constant (a) and the coefficient (b), regardless of a unit's spatial location (i):
Equation (1) Here there is a single "global" parameter estimate for each structural predictor. However, the GWR model does not assume the parameter is independent of location (i.e., spatially invariant) and allows the constant and coefficient to vary by observation:
The estimated parameters are dependent on location, symbolized as geographic coordinates (u i ,v i ), and account for the location of each observation in the sample relative to all the others. Each NC in the sample becomes the center of a local regression model that uses a subsample of units around it. The final result of the GWR model is a set of "local" parameter estimates and model fit statistics for each NC; the current study generates 342 local regressions, one centered on each NC in the sample. When determining the local (sub)sample size, I employed a spatially adaptive weighting function (Fotheringham et al. 2002) where locations closer to (u i ,v i ) are weighted more heavily than those further away, so the local sample size is smaller in areas with many data points and larger in areas with fewer. This strategy accounts for the distribution and size differences of NCs across Chicago, where neighborhoods tend to be smaller and denser closer to the city center, and keeps local sample size and standard errors of the regression models relatively consistent. After the GWR procedure estimated the entire set of local regression parameters and statistics, a geographical variability test indicated there was significant spatial variation in the disadvantage parameter estimates across neighborhoods. This signified the level of disadvantage influenced homicide rates differently across NCs, as suggested by prior research (Becker 2016; Cahill and Mulligan 2007; Graif and Sampson 2009; Light and Harris 2012) . Dummy variables of within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage were added to the model to examine if and how structural stability accounted for this spatial variation. Including the change measures completely eliminated spatial variation in the association; within-neighborhood change was positively related to homicide rates, net of the level of concentrated disadvantage in 1990. Neighborhoods experiencing more change between 1970-1990 were predicted to have higher homicide rates. Having partially replicated previous findings, it was appropriate to move forward and apply the same strategy to models estimating the relationship between the level of concentrated disadvantage in 1990 and neighborhood collective efficacy in 1995, which are presented here. If withinneighborhood dynamics impact the cross-sectional relationship between disadvantage and homicide, this influence is theoretically mediated by collective efficacy. I expect the cross-sectional disadvantage-collective efficacy association will significantly vary across Chicago (though I am unaware of existing research directly testing this hypothesis). After controlling for within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage the association will be spatially invariant, and the level of disadvantage in 1990 will be negatively related to collective efficacy in 1995, as found by others (Sampson et al. 1997) . Furthermore, I hypothesize that changes in disadvantage from 1970-1990 will be disruptive, or negatively associated with collective efficacy in 1995, net of the level of disadvantage in 1990. Finally, I construct a full cross-sectional model of disadvantage, collective efficacy, and neighborhood homicide rates. If within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage significantly predict collective efficacy, a measure of collective efficacy is expected to capture the influence of changes in disadvantage, essentially acting as a proxy measure of structural (in)stability. Therefore, any remaining relationship between the level of disadvantage in 1990 and homicide rates in 2001-2005 will be spatially invariant without including measures of within-neighborhood change in the model. When included in the model the change variables will not significantly predict neighborhood homicide rates.
R E S U L T S

Concentrated Disadvantage and Collective Efficacy
The examination of the concentrated disadvantage-collective efficacy association begins with a crosssectional OLS model for comparative purposes. I hypothesized that the relationship would vary significantly across neighborhoods, and that adding measures of within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage would account for this spatial variation (at least in part). The results of the basic OLS and GWR models in Table 3 (Panel A) are consistent with this hypothesis. In the OLS model, neighborhoods with higher levels of concentrated disadvantage have significantly lower levels of collective efficacy (b ¼ À.602, p < .001), net of immigrant concentration and residential stability. Disadvantage has the largest standardized effect of the three structural predictors (b ¼ À.681), and the overall OLS model predicts more than half of the variation in collective efficacy across Chicago (adjusted R 2 ¼ .570). However, the results of the basic GWR model suggest the association between disadvantage and collective efficacy is not spatially invariant. The relationship is usually significant in the expected negative direction, but its strength varies greatly across NCs (between b ¼ À1.213 and b ¼ À.331) and the geographic variability test confirms this variation is significant (p < .001), indicating the spatial invariance assumption is violated. The GWR model explains somewhat more overall variation in collective efficacy (adjusted R 2 ¼ .642) than the OLS model, and is a significantly better fit with the data (F ¼ 3.825, p < .001). Local regression models explain between 28 percent and 80 percent of the variation in neighborhood collective efficacy, suggesting a global model overlooks substantial and systematic variation in key structural relationships and explanatory power across Chicago neighborhoods. By and large the GRW results conform to expectations: higher levels of disadvantage in 1990 often predict significantly lower levels of collective efficacy in 1995. However, this association is not always significant, and its strength varies a great deal across NCs, violating a key assumption of global modeling strategies like OLS regression. Overall the results suggest a more complex model of the associations between structural conditions and social outcomes like collective efficacy and crime rates is warranted, leading to the next set of analyses.
The previous models show the cross-sectional association between concentrated disadvantage (in 1990) and collective efficacy (in 1995) significantly varies across NCs. Since NCs that are structurally stable over time are expected to have higher collective efficacy than predicted by the level of disadvantage alone-and inversely, those experiencing instability are expected to have lower collective efficacy-I added the dummy measures of within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage (omitting the first quartile as the comparison group) to the GWR model. The spatial variation in the disadvantagecollective efficacy association found earlier was expected to disappear in the elaborated GWR model, and the results in Table 3 (Panel B) support this hypothesis. Controlling for within-neighborhood change substantially reduces variation in the concentrated disadvantage coefficient, and geographic variability in the strength of this association is no longer statistically significant (at p < .05). Figure 3 visually compares the basic (Panel A) and elaborated (Panel B) GWR models by mapping the t-test values of local disadvantage coefficients, with lighter shades indicating smaller t-values. The association between disadvantage and collective efficacy is much more consistent after controlling for within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage. Though areas remain where disadvantage is more or less strongly related to collective efficacy, the variation is no longer significant. Having established that within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage account for spatial variation in the cross-sectional disadvantage-collective efficacy relationship, an elaborated OLS model that now satisfies the spatial invariance assumption was used to explore the effects of changes in disadvantage on collective efficacy (Table 3 , Panel B). There is a significant improvement in model fit compared to the basic OLS model (F ¼ 11.32, p < .001; not shown). The most notable difference is in the strength of the cross-sectional association between disadvantage and collective efficacy: the disadvantage coefficient is substantially smaller once the change variables are included in the model (b ¼ À.312, p < .001). While it continues to be the strongest among the structural predictors (b ¼ À.353) the standardized coefficient is only slightly more than half the size as in the basic OLS model. Neighborhoods with greater changes in concentrated disadvantage from 1970-1990 are expected to have significantly lower levels of collective efficacy in 1995, net of the level of disadvantage in 1990. The relationship follows a generally linear pattern: each successive quartile of change predicts an accompanying drop in collective efficacy. Compared to no change, minor increases in disadvantage from 1970-1990 are expected to lower collective efficacy by .329 (p < .01), while moderate and major increases lower collective efficacy by .661 and 1.022 respectively (p < .001).
4 Both the level of concentrated disadvantage in 1990 and changes in disadvantage between 1970 and 1990 significantly influence an NC's level of collective efficacy in 1995, with change appearing to disrupt the growth and operation of collective efficacy. This suggests neighborhoods with similar levels of disadvantage in 1990, but different historical patterns of disadvantage, will have significantly different levels of collective efficacy in 1995. This finding has important theoretical implications for predicting neighborhood crime rates, which are explored next. The Full Model The preceding analyses make it clear that changes in neighborhood disadvantage matter for the prediction of collective efficacy. The remaining task is to construct a complete model of neighborhood homicide rates that accounts for cross-sectional levels of disadvantage as well as within-neighborhood changes in it, as mediated by collective efficacy (see Figure 1) . Given earlier findings, collective efficacy is hypothesized to mediate both the effects of concentrated disadvantage in 1990 and those of changes in disadvantage from 1970-1990 on homicide rates. Collective efficacy at least partially mediates the relationship between the level of disadvantage and crime (Browning et al. 2004; Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1997; Sampson et al. 1999) , and extending the theory to explain the effects of within-neighborhood change in similar fashion is logical. If the influence of structural (in)-stability is channeled through collective efficacy, then collective efficacy would act as a proxy for change; adding it to the model would eliminate spatial variation in the cross-sectional relationship between the level of disadvantage and homicide without including change measures. If the change measures were included in the model, they would no longer be significantly related to neighborhood homicide rates.
The results of the basic full GWR model in Table 4 (Panel A) do not support these predictions, however; substantial variation in the disadvantage-homicide relationship remains after controlling for collective efficacy. The association ranges between null (b ¼ À.512) and significantly positive (b ¼ .747), and the geographic variability test indicates this variation is significant (p < .001). Collective efficacy appears to partially mediate the cross-sectional relationship between the level of concentrated disadvantage and neighborhood homicide rates in the OLS model-the coefficient is smaller here (b ¼ .366, p < .001) than in an OLS model that did not control for collective efficacy (b ¼ .461, p < .001; see Table A1 , Panel A in the online Appendix)-but the results contradict my hypothesis that collective efficacy would completely account for spatial variation in the disadvantage-homicide relationship across neighborhoods.
It was logical to expect that because change appeared to disrupt the generation of collective efficacy in the earlier analyses, this disruption would explain spatial variation in the strength of the crosssectional relationship between neighborhood disadvantage and homicide rates. Since including collective efficacy in the model did not account for this variation as expected, the question remains: what does explain it, if not collective efficacy? To further explore this question, the dummy measures of change were added back to the model to see if within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage, now net of collective efficacy, could again account for spatial variation in the cross-sectional disadvantagehomicide relationship. This appears to be the case. As shown in Table 4 (Panel B), the elaborated full GWR model of neighborhood structural conditions, collective efficacy, and homicide rates reveals that controlling for changes in disadvantage substantially reduces local variation in the concentrated disadvantage-homicide relationship, net of collective efficacy. Both the minimum (b ¼ .028) and maximum (b ¼ .563) coefficients have shrunk, and spatial variation in the parameter estimate is no longer significant (at p < .05). A visual comparison of t-test values for the local disadvantage coefficients in the basic and elaborate models, controlling for collective efficacy, is presented in Figure 4 . Even with collective efficacy in the model, it is not until the change measures are included that spatial variation in the strength of the disadvantage-homicide relationship becomes nonsignificant.
These results indicate the global OLS estimate of the disadvantage-homicide relationship now satisfies the spatial invariance assumption and is a relatively accurate estimate of the association across the entire sample. The cross-sectional associations between the level of concentrated disadvantage and homicide rates, and between collective efficacy and homicide rates, are both statistically significant. Consistent with existing research, more disadvantaged neighborhoods are expected to have higher homicide rates (b ¼ .255, p < .001), while neighborhoods with more collective efficacy are expected to have lower homicide rates (b ¼ À.109, p < .001). Collective efficacy also appears to partially mediate the cross-sectional relationship between disadvantage and homicide, though Within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage appear to have a direct independent association with homicide rates, even after controlling for the neighborhood's level of disadvantage and collective efficacy. It remains theoretically logical to suppose that this association is channeled through some mediating variable; however, collective efficacy does not appear to be the (only) social mechanism through which structural changes operate.
D I S C U S S I O N A N D C O N C L U S I O N
This study builds on existing research on neighborhood structural conditions and crime by exploring the influence of within-neighborhood dynamics on collective efficacy, one mechanism theorized to link concentrated disadvantage to homicide rates. Previous work has found that, contrary to the spatial invariance assumption, cross-sectional associations between structural conditions and crime outcomes appear to operate differently across macro-units (Becker 2016; Cahill and Mulligan 2007; Graif and Sampson 2009; Light and Harris 2012) . The current study extends these findings and adds weight to the argument that within-neighborhood trajectories of change (or stability) play an important role in predicting not only crime, but also collective efficacy, and should be accounted for in future research on neighborhood effects (see Sampson 2012 Sampson , 2013 .
There are theoretical reasons to expect that within-neighborhood structural stability contributes to the production and operation of collective efficacy, one social process believed to mediate the relationship between structural conditions and crime. While neighborhoods can appear similar in crosssection, sharing similar levels of disadvantage (or other structural conditions), there may be substantial differences in their histories of disadvantage. In turn, these trajectories are linked to different levels of collective efficacy-social cohesion and mutual trust coupled with the exercise of informal social control (Sampson 2012; Sampson et al. 1997 )-and thus different crime rates, net of the level of concentrated disadvantage at a given point in time. I examined spatial variation in the crosssectional relationship between concentrated disadvantage and collective efficacy and tested the hypothesis that within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage from are significantly related to neighborhood collective efficacy in 1995, net of the level of disadvantage in 1990. In a key finding of the current study, this hypothesis was supported. Significant spatial variation in the cross-sectional association between disadvantage and collective efficacy was accounted for by including measures of within-neighborhood change in GWR models. OLS models suggested within-neighborhood change disrupts the creation and operation of collective efficacy, where neighborhoods experiencing more change in disadvantage had significantly lower levels of collective efficacy than predicted by the level of disadvantage alone. These results are consistent with suggestions that superficially positive changes in neighborhood disadvantage can actually be detrimental to the social functioning of the neighborhood (Covington and Taylor 1989; Kreager et al. 2011; Taylor and Covington 1988; Thompson, Bucerius, and Luguya 2013; van Wilsem et al. 2006) , and that both increases and decreases in disadvantage may be harmful (Bursik 1986) .
After discovering the role of change in the disadvantage-collective efficacy relationship, I constructed a complete model of disadvantage, collective efficacy, and homicide. Given the earlier results and the theoretical process linking neighborhood disadvantage to homicide via collective efficacy, I expected the influence of changes in disadvantage on homicide would be channeled through collective efficacy; in a GWR model, the disadvantage-homicide association would be spatially invariant after accounting for collective efficacy. On the contrary, including a measure of collective efficacy in the model did not eliminate substantial and significant spatial variation in the cross-sectional disadvantage-homicide relationship. OLS models indicated the direct relationship between concentrated disadvantage in 1990 and subsequent homicide rate in 2001-2005 was mediated to a degree by collective efficacy in 1995, as expected (Sampson et al. 1997) . However, variation in the size of the disadvantage parameter estimates across Chicago neighborhoods remained relatively large and statistically significant in the GWR model. This led to a second key finding: even after controlling for the mediating variable of collective efficacy, within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage continued to play an important part in the prediction of homicide. The relationship between the level of neighborhood disadvantage and homicide only became spatially invariant once the full model controlled for within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage. This continues to suggest within-neighborhood change is disruptive, though through another social mechanism in addition to collective efficacy. Net of the level of concentrated disadvantage, immigrant concentration, and residential stability in 1990 and collective efficacy in 1995, neighborhoods with more change from 1970-1990 were predicted to have significantly higher homicide rates.
All told these analyses suggest both a neighborhood's level of concentrated disadvantage and internal historical changes in disadvantage influence homicide rates, though not entirely for the expected reason. While changes in disadvantage were significantly related to collective efficacy, this mechanism does not fully mediate the association between change and homicide rates. Within-neighborhood changes in disadvantage continued to have a significant direct association with homicide, even after accounting for neighborhood collective efficacy. This suggests future theoretical and empirical work on neighborhood structural conditions and crime should continue to attend to the inherently dynamic nature of neighborhoods, though how these dynamics operate remains an open question. The current analyses were limited by the direction and degree of changes in disadvantage within Chicago neighborhoods between 1970 and 1990 (which underwent either no change or several degrees of increasing disadvantage). Future work should explore places and periods that experienced a wider variety of changes in disadvantage over time, and other methods of operationalizing neighborhood change (Delmelle 2016) .
The social mechanism through which structural change operates also remains unclear. Here, change was interpreted as disrupting the generation and operation of collective efficacy. A potentially fruitful avenue for future work would be to explore the relationships between within-neighborhood change and other social processes theorized to mediate the relationship between structural conditions and crime, such as negotiated coexistence (Browning et al. 2004) . It is possible that the creation of neighborhood social networks between offenders and conventional neighborhood residents and "the accretion of social capital that may be employed as a buffer against social-control activities" (Browning 2009 (Browning :1560 to undermine the social control function of collective efficacy require time to develop and function. The temporal dynamics of negotiated coexistence may be further complicated if structural stability influences the mechanisms of collective efficacy and reciprocated exchange in different ways. For example, neighborhood stability may be less important for establishing rules of informal social control than for networks of reciprocated exchange, two related but distinct dimensions of neighborhood organization (Sampson et al. 1999) .
Within-neighborhood structural changes may also operate through the creation, transmission, and persistence of criminogenic subcultures (Anderson 1999; Tittle 1989 ) and legal cynicism (Carr, Napolitano, and Keating 2007; Sampson and Bartusch 1998) . Early theorizing on social disorganization incorporated the concept of subcultural norms of delinquency, embedded in a temporal process (though cultural elements were largely diminished or rejected in later theorizing in favor of a focus on social control; see Kornhauser 1978) . In persistently disadvantaged neighborhoods, "the existence of a powerful system of criminal values and relationships . . . is the product of a cumulative process extending back into the history of the community and of the city" (Shaw and McKay 1969:320) , and in these areas "delinquency has developed in the form of a social tradition" (p. 316). More recent theories, such as Elijah Anderson's (1999) "code of the street," similarly imply that subcultures do not form within disadvantaged neighborhoods instantaneously, but emerge as a function of both structural conditions and time. Research on legal cynicism and mistrust of law enforcement likewise suggests that they are to some degree a result of exposure to "pervasive segregation and economic subjugation" (Sampson and Bartusch 1998:801) and the "lived experience of negative interactions" with law enforcement (Carr et al. 2007:469) . This again implicates a temporally dynamic process that is distinct from the effects of a neighborhood's structural conditions at a single point in time. It is possible empirical models paralleling those here, but based on alternative theoretical perspectives, would similarly discover that neighborhood structural (in)stability has an important effect on these social mechanisms.
The nature of disadvantage in urban areas has qualitatively changed over several decades, creating mobility "traps" and high levels of social isolation (Massey and Denton 1993; Sampson 2009; Wilson 2012) . However, while high levels of disadvantage in these neighborhoods predict more crime than in less-disadvantaged neighborhoods, it seems possible any structural stability that emerges alongside this concentration process may actually limit the amount of crime occurring in the neighborhood. For a given level of disadvantage, it appears beneficial to the neighborhood if that level is relatively stable. This study clearly demonstrates that within-neighborhood dynamics matter, linking criminological studies of social ecological neighborhood effects and the developmental outlook of life course theories of crime. This is a potentially fruitful avenue for future research that explores the intersection of social mechanisms and dynamic processes suggested by Sampson (2012:46) , perhaps leading to a neighborhood-level "life course" perspective that incorporates internal temporal dynamics of neighborhood effects on crime.
